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in Commercial Leases 
 
W D Duncan* 
 
Much has been written in the past decade on the subject of the implication of a term of 
good faith in contracts in Australia, particularly since the judgment of Priestley JA in 
Renard Constructions (ME) Pty Ltd v Minister for Public Works (1992) 26 NSWLR 
234. 
Except for an early article by Rachael Mulheron; “Good Faith and Commercial Leases: 
New Opportunities for the Tenant” (1996) 4 APLJ 223, very little else has been written 
with respect to the possible application of the doctrine to commercial leases. 
With the advent of two later New South Wales Supreme Court decisions Alcatel 
Australia Ltd v Scarcella (1998) 44 NSWLR 349 and, more recently, Advance Fitness 
v Bondi Diggers [1999] NSWSC 264, the question of the application of the doctrine in 
the commercial leasing context has been examined. 
This article briefly considers the nature and substance of the doctrine against the 
background of the relationship of lessor and lessee and examines in some depth the 
Australian decisions on commercial leases where it has been sought, unsuccessfully, to 
apply the doctrine. 
The article concludes by suggesting that as a standard commercial lease usually covers 
the field of agreement between lessor and lessee and as a lessee has a high degree of 
statutory protection derived from equitable principles, there may be little room for the 
operation of the doctrine in this legal environment. 
 
 
Context 
During the past decade in Australia there has been much written upon whether or not an 
obligation of good faith and fair dealing can be implied in commercial contracts in 
Australia.  Much of the literature
1
 arose from a judgment of Priestley JA in Renard 
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Constructions (ME) Pty Ltd v Minister for Public Works
2
 who held that a contractual 
power in a building contract, which permitted the principal to take over the builders 
work, was required to be exercised reasonably, this requirement being as a result of the 
implication of a term that the principal should act in good faith when exercising 
discretions under the contract.
3
 Although there was some early judicial deprecation of the 
application of this principle,
4
 it has since has been applied in several cases with approval, 
among these being Hughes Bros Pty Ltd v Trustees of the Roman Catholic Church for the 
Archdiocese of Sydney
5
 and Hughes Aircraft Systems International v Air Services 
Australia.
6
 However, there is much controversy as to how the courts, and in what 
circumstances, are to impose this obligation. This concerns the matter whether the term is 
to be incorporated by implication in the conventional way,
7
 or whether it should be used 
as a canon of construction of the particular contract being adjudicated upon.
8
 
 
It is not intended here to review the wealth of literature nor all the cases upon the 
question of application of a “good faith” term. Instead, it is proposed to consider how this 
doctrine has been applied in cases relating to commercial leases. However, before doing 
so, one should briefly set the scene appropriately by considering the nature of a 
commercial lease as a certain form of contract. 
 
The Commercial Lease as a Contract 
It is trite law that a lease has two functions. The first is to grant the lessee an estate or 
interest in the land leased. The second is to embody the arrangements between the lessor 
and lessee in a contractual form. However, there has been much litigation over the extent 
to which contractual principles apply to leases, given the dichotomy in functions. The 
interaction of these two functions can become irrational in certain circumstances, for 
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example, where the leased premises are destroyed during the currency of the lease. The 
destruction of the matter of a contract not conveying an interest in land would usually 
mean that the contract would be frustrated. In the case of a lease, grant of the interest in 
land would not be affected by destruction of a physical subject matter of the lease and the 
liability to pay rent therefore would be held to continue.
9
 This view has been followed in 
Australia.
10
 However, in 1981 the House of Lords in National Carriers Ltd v Panalpina 
(Northern) Ltd
11
 reconsidered the principle in the light of commercial reality. Without 
descent into detail, the court said that in circumstances where the doctrine of frustration 
might apply to an ordinary contract, the court might consider whether a term might be 
implied into a lease which would determine in those circumstances and release the lessee 
from any liability under the lease from that time.
12
 Regrettably, there has been no 
opportunity since for an appellate court to directly consider this question in Australia. 
 
In 1906, the High Court in Buchanan v Byrnes
13
 treated a lease as a contract holding that 
a lessor had a right to damages for lost rent, maintenance costs rates and taxes payable by 
the lessee under the lease after the lessee had abandoned the premises and the lessor had 
re-entered. More recently, the High Court has held directly that the contractual principle 
of repudiation applies to leases,
14
 and, more specifically, the same court in Progressive 
Mailing House Pty Ltd v Tabali
15
 applied the law of repudiation in contract to the 
conduct of a lessee guilty of the breach of numerous obligations a the lease. These rules 
have since been applied on a number of occasions.
16
 Other contractual characteristics 
have been ascribed to leases such as the duty of a party to mitigate loss,
17
 and the law 
relating to characterisation of terms as essential and non-essential.
18
 Again, there is 
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adequate literature on this subject which gives further examples.
19
 For the purposes of 
this exposition, it will be assumed that a lease can for most purposes be treated as a 
contract. 
 
The Relationship of Lessor and Lessee 
At all levels, it would appear that the core relationship of lessor and lessee is simply that 
of one contracting party and another. Regardless of the duties imposed upon both parties 
by a lease, all things being equal, a lessor does not owe a fiduciary duty to a lessee 
merely arising out or the existence of the relationship. The point is well illustrated by the 
case of Peyser v Northpoint Properties Ltd
20
 where a lease made provision that rent could 
be adjusted if the lessor’s outgoings exceeded outgoings at an earlier period. The lessor 
claimed an increase and the lessee indicated a desire to inspect relevant records of the 
lessor but was refused. The lessee sought a declaration of an entitlement to inspection. 
There was no express term in the lease relating to inspection. The lessee argued amongst 
other things, that there was a fiduciary relationship between himself and the lessor with 
respect to the disclosure of records and this obligation was based on an alleged duty to 
account under the lease. The decisions relied upon to support this claim were based upon 
the law of principal and agent,
21
 where there is a clear obligation to account. In the same 
decision, there was an ingenious attempt by the lessee to claim some proprietary interest 
in the records held by the lessor based on the decision of Price v Harrison.
22
 That case 
was an action by a lessor against a lessee for monies payable under an agreement for 
lease, the lessee having obtained an order to inspect certain letters upon which it was 
surmised the lessor intended to rely for the purpose for establishing the agreement. There 
was a suggestion that the other party in possession of the letters was holding it as “a 
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trustee” for the other and that the party requiring the documents had “an interest” in 
them.
23
 However, Rath J in Peyser v Northpoint Properties Ltd
24
 could not make out any 
proprietary right of a lessee to a document held by the lessor, the only obligation of the 
lessor being to deliver it to the lessee in consequence of the exercise of a power of a court 
to order discovery and inspection.
25
 
 
Nor is a lease in the nature of a joint venture,
26
 or a partnership.
27
 In both those instances, 
fiduciary obligations are owed one to the other and in consequence, the parties owe each 
other a duty of good faith. At its highest, the fiduciary must completely subordinate 
himself or herself to the interests of the beneficiary.
28
 This is not the hallmark of an 
ordinary relationship of lessor and lessee. However, the more imprecise duty of good 
faith, or as it is sometimes known, a duty of fair dealing, does not require the 
subordination of interests of one party to another but permits self interest in the context of 
acting fairly.
29
 The breach of the contractual duty of good faith results only in damages 
where as breach of the fiduciary duty may give rise to more specific remedies, such as 
account or the imposition of a constructive trust.
30
 
 
Examples of the Exercise of Unfettered Discretion by the Lessor 
There have been some instances of cases of commercial leases where the lessor has been 
expressly given an unfettered discretion to make a decision, which would have some 
bearing on the liability of the lessee. This has largely related to the selection or approval 
of insurance of the demised premises. For example, in Viscount Tredegar v Hardwood
31
 a 
99-year lease contained a covenant by the lessee to insure against fire in the joint names 
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of lessor and lessee “in the Law Fire Office or in some other responsible insurance office 
to be approved by the lessor”. The lessee, as an assignee of the lease, failed to continue 
the policy at the Law Fire Office and took out a policy with another company whom the 
lessor refused to approved on the basis that as the Fire’s premises were part of a large 
number of other houses on the same estate, it was more appropriate that all the properties 
should be insured with the same office. The lessor eventually brought proceedings 
against the lessee to forfeit the lease on the basis of a breach of this covenant in failing to 
obtain approval. The question for the House of Lords was whether or not the lessor had 
an absolute right to withhold approval for any reason. In giving the judgment of the 
House, Lord Shaw of Dunfermline distinguished the instant case from that of withholding 
an approval for an assignment or a subletting on the grounds that the right to refuse 
approval in the latter case usually would expressly not be withheld unreasonably. In this 
case, there was no such restriction or condition upon the right of approval or disapproval.  
In upsetting the judgment of the Court of Appeal, Lord Shaw would not import an 
implication into the lease that the consent of the lessor to any responsible insurance office 
selected by the lessee not be unreasonably withheld, nor an implication that the lessor 
furnish a justification for his refusal.
32
 Both Lord Shaw and Lord Phillimore held that the 
lessor was acting perfectly reasonably in refusing approval to the lessor’s preferred 
insurer.
33
 
 
A very similar situation arose again in the decision of Bandar Property Holdings Ltd v JS 
Darwen (Successors) Ltd.
34
 Under the terms of a 21-year lease, the lessor agreed to keep 
the demised premises insured at some insurance offices of repute or at Lloyds. The 
lessees expressly agreed to pay the lessor the amount of the premiums involved. The 
lessor placed insurance in accordance with that clause but at a higher premium than they 
might have done had they acceded to the lessee’s direction to place insurance through 
another firm of Lloyds Brokers. The question for the court was whether the lessor had an 
unfettered discretion to place the insurance as they saw fit notwithstanding that it 
imposed a heavier financial burden on the lessee. In other words, would the court imply a 
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term that the lessor should place the insurance so as not to impose that burden. Roskill J, 
implying the “business efficacy” rule, held that the court would not imply a term in these 
circumstances as no implication was necessary for the bargain to work.
35
 The lessee had 
argued firstly, that it was quite unreasonable to read the covenant free from all 
restrictions in favour of the lessee and, by implication, whilst the lessor was not bound of 
necessity to obtain the cheapest rate of insurance, the lessor was bound to look at all the 
circumstances to avoid an unnecessarily heavy burden on the lessee.
36
  
 
In neither case is the doctrine of the implication of a term of good faith mentioned.  
However, it is submitted that these would be circumstances in which the lessee may have 
argued that such an implication might be appropriate. In the first case, the court 
rationalised the decision of the lessor on the basis of facilitating the management of 
insurance cover for the demised premises as part of a cover for a number of other 
premises and, in the second case, the court justified its refusal to accede to the lessee’s 
request of implied term, by applying the business efficacy rule.   
 
In the light of more recent cases to be considered later in this article, there is no certainty 
that a term would have been implied had these questions arisen in the context of a current 
commercial lease.
37
 
 
The business efficacy rule is still a touchstone for the implication of terms into a 
commercial agreements, and in the absence of dishonesty (of which there was no 
evidence in either of these cases) a lessee might well remain disappointed if these 
situations had arisen today.   
 
This is, to some extent, borne out by the decision in VL Credits Pty Ltd v Switzerland 
General Insurance Co Ld (No. 2)
38
 where a lease provided that in the event of the 
demised premises being totally or so substantially destroyed that reinstatement shall in 
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the opinion of the lessor be unjustified, the lessor or lessee may within thirty days elect to 
determine the lease. Upon the building being destroyed by a fire, the lessor elected to 
terminate the lease. The lessee argued that the lessor’s opinion should have been 
reasonably formed that the lessor had unreasonably concluded that reinstatement was 
unjustified. This argument was not accepted by the court and, in rejecting it, Ormiston J 
said that “at (its) highest, the only qualification that should be implied into the expression 
is that the opinion (of the lessor) should be honestly held”.39 
 
These decisions clearly indicate that, historically, the courts have been loathed to imply 
that a lessor or lessee in commercial leases be required to exercise a discretion in a 
reasonable manner or in good faith and, except for those matters governed by statute, the 
lessor can unreasonably withhold consent to most requests.
40
 
 
Substance of the Terms Imposing Obligation of Good Faith 
There have been a number of attempts judicially to explain the substance of an implied 
term of good faith. If the substance is understood, the circumstances in which it may be 
implied can be more easily identified. Priestley JA in Renard Constructions (NE) Pty Ltd 
v Minister for Public Works
41
 commented that: 
 
“…People generally, including judges and other lawyers, from all strands of the 
community, have grown used to the courts applying standards of fairness to 
contract which are wholly consistent with the existence in all contracts of a duty 
upon parties of good faith and fair dealing in its performance.  In my view, this is, 
in these days, the expected standard, and anything less is contrary to prevailing 
community expectations”.42 
 
As Elisabeth Peden acknowledges in her article, there has been much academic comment 
on the possible meaning of the expression “good faith” and few judges have been brave 
enough to postulate the possible content of the obligations.
43
 Some of the relevant 
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decisions concern express agreements “to negotiate in good faith” which expression has 
generally been considered to have legal meaning. For example, in Con Kallergis Pty Ltd 
trading as Sunlighting Australasia Pty Ltd v Calshonie Pty Ltd (formerly CW Norris Pty 
Ltd),
44
 a question arose as to whether an agreement for valuation of variations in a 
building contract was uncertain or incomplete on the ground that the agreement provided 
that the price of the work was to be negotiated by one party to the contract with a third 
party. The argument proceeded on the assumption that the contracting party’s obligation 
to negotiate, may probably be seen as an obligation to negotiate in good faith or to do so 
honestly and reasonably.  The court made the following remarks, in obiter: 
 
“It was submitted… that even if the obligation undertaken … was to negotiate in 
good faith… the obligation was still too uncertain to admit enforcement.  
Although there may be difficult questions of fact and degree about whether 
evidence of particular conduct reveals lack of good faith or lack of honesty or 
reasonableness, the obligation to act in good faith or honestly or reasonably is an 
obligation that is certain.”45 
 
In this instance, the court aligned good faith with honesty. Parties have always been 
under an obligation to act honestly in the performance of a contract.
46
 In Hughes Aircraft 
Systems International v Air Services,
47
 Finn J, in obiter, describes “fair dealing which 
seems to be a synonym for good faith as a major (if not openly articulated) organising 
idea in Australian law… and one (he would consider) to be an implied duty that 
expresses a generalisation of universal application being the standard of conduct which 
all contracting parties are to be expected to adhere throughout the lives of their 
contracts”.48 Einstein J, in Aiton v Transfield,49 after an exhaustive investigation as to the 
meaning of the obligation to negotiate or perform in good faith, found that the content of 
any good faith requirement depended upon the context (statutory or otherwise) and the 
particular factual circumstances in which the obligation might arise.
50
 In that particular 
case, there was an express obligation to “negotiate or mediate in good faith”. His Honour 
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expressed the content of the obligation in that circumstance for a party to undertake the 
process with an open mind, with a willingness to consider options to resolve the dispute 
without obliging the party to act in the interests of the other party or to act otherwise than 
in self interest.
51
 
 
Stapleton, in an article entitled “Good Faith in Private Law”52 opined that to act in good 
faith required that a person not act dishonestly, act with sincerity and not deliberately 
exploit a position of dominance over another. Stapleton also drew a distinction between 
good faith and reasonableness, the standard of reasonable behaviour, he says, being more 
demanding than a requirement of good faith.
53
 In another context, a term of a contract 
that required a party to act in good faith and fairly was held to impose an obligation upon 
that party not to act capriciously, and provided the party exercising the power acted 
reasonably in normal circumstances, the duty to act fairly and in good faith would 
ordinarily be satisfied.
54
 
 
There is nothing new in this in the contractual context. In Secured Income Real Estate 
(Australia) Ltd v St Martins Investments Pty Ltd,
55
 the High Court, in recognising the 
implication of a duty to co-operate in the doing of acts necessary for the performance of a 
contract by the parties, had to consider whether one party had acted capriciously or 
arbitrarily in its performance of the contract. Speaking of the meaning of the expression 
“arbitrarily” (in the context of a refusal of consent to an assignment of a lease) Mason J 
(as he then was) said: 
 
“I am inclined to agree that the expressions “unreasonably”, “wholly 
unreasonably” and “without reasonable cause”, practically mean the same thing 
though I should prefer to say that “arbitrarily” connotes “unreasonably” in the 
sense that what was done was done “without reasonable cause”. In these 
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circumstances, I doubt whether “capriciously” adds anything except perhaps to 
direct attention to the motivation of the respondent.”56 
 
Therefore, can this be said to be the substance of the obligation to act in good faith, 
express or implied? It might be concluded that such an obligation would import notions 
of all the elements of reasonableness, honesty, fair play, lack of caprice and lack of 
arbitrariness. To what extent are the motives of the party whose actions are the subject of 
an alleged breach of the implied obligation of good faith relevant?  
 
It is little wonder, then, that the parliament has directed the courts in determining whether 
a corporation has engaged in unconscionable conduct, to have regard to a number of 
matters, one of which the extent to which a party has acted in good faith.
57
 There is a 
clear implication, of a community expectation exemplified in this legislation that all 
contracting parties to which the legislation applies will, in their dealings with other 
parties, act with probity and, to some extent fairly.   
 
However, to what extent this doctrine might impact on the relationship of commercial 
lessor and lessee must, it is submitted, depend very much upon the particular 
circumstances in which it may be desired that it operate and the express terms of the lease 
where such an obligation is to be implied. 
 
Circumstances in Which Implication May be Made 
It is conceded that very few commercial leases would contain an express term that the 
parties must act in good faith. Therefore, in the case of a commercial lease, the term 
would generally have to be implied. As a rule, a term of a contract will not be implied 
unless it is necessary to give business efficacy to a contract, unless it is reasonable and 
equitable, and capable of clear expression without contradicting any express term.
58
  
Whilst the obligation, as an implied obligation, might be engrafted upon the exercise of 
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any power under a contract, it has found a most comfortable residence as qualifying the 
exercise of a termination power, but not so as to act as a restriction on that power, 
particularly if it is in general terms.
59
 The case law also suggests a more ready 
implication in standard form contracts containing a power of termination.
60
 Commercial 
leases are not standard form contracts. The examples of the implication afforded an 
opportunity in non-standard forms of relationship are more broadly based. It is 
appropriate that some of the circumstances in which there has been an attempt, either 
successfully or unsuccessfully, to imply such a term into a commercial lease, be 
exemplified. 
 
Examples of Implication of Terms of Good Faith in Commercial Leases 
 
(a) Assignment (or subletting) of lease 
Assignments of commercial leases are already regulated in most states
61
 and the 
assignment of retail shop leases are even more so regulated.
62
 There are very few 
examples of the application of the principle in this area of leasing. In the one 
significant example, Australian Mutual Provident Society v 400 St Kilda Road Pty 
Ltd,
63
 a commercial lease lawfully excluded the provisions of s 144 of the Property 
Law Act 1958 (Vic) permitting a lessor to unreasonably withhold consent to an 
assignment. The lessor withheld its consent to a lessee subletting portions of and 
effecting improvements to a building in order to force the lessee to vary the lease by 
making its terms more favourable rent wise to a prospective purchaser of the 
property. The lessor also claimed that the lessee had sublet parts of the premises 
without consent, carried out improvements without consent and used the premises 
outside the permitted use. The lessee disputed these claims and alleged that it was a 
                                                 
59
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condition precedent to refusal of consent by the lessor to subletting (or the approval 
of improvements), that the lessor acts in good faith. On the strength of this, the 
lessee claimed relief against forfeiture after the lessor attempted to forfeit the lease 
on the ground of those alleged breaches. 
 
Effectively, the lessee was endeavouring to overcome the express exclusion of 
statutory expression of reasonableness by refusing consent to the subletting in 
urging the court to imply that the refusal of consent must be exercised in good faith.   
 
In view of the lawful, express exclusion of the reasonableness provision which may 
have otherwise precluded the lessor from unreasonably refusing consent to 
appropriate sublettings, McGarvie J found that it would not be correct to imply a 
term which under another “legal label” would partially reapply that exclusion.64  
However, in respect of the withholding of approval of materials, plans, 
specifications and designs for improvements, particularly with a view to forcing the 
lessee to vary the lease in relation to rent, his Honour was not so constrained by any 
statutory provisions. Accordingly, he was prepared to hold that a term should be 
implied in the lease that the lessor could not unreasonably withhold approval for the 
construction of improvements in the building, as the refusal would be held to be 
unreasonable given the motive of the lessor.
65
 In this case, McGarvie J did not 
imply a term that approval must be exercised “in good faith” as he found that the 
expression “too vague.” Instead, he implied a term of “reasonableness” which he 
said was a “tried and reliable and working tool in the law of contract”.66 
 
Given the development of law relating to the implication of the term of good faith 
since that decision, in August 1989, a refinement in the idea of “good faith” now 
means more than mere reasonableness. Current formulations of the concept of 
“good faith” may have strengthened this lessee’s hand in respect of the refusal to 
                                                 
64
  Ibid at 653. 
65
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consent to the subletting based on the lessor’s improper motive.67 However, given 
the admitted subtleties in the differences between the concepts of “good faith” and 
“reasonableness”, could it now be possible to withhold consent unreasonably, but 
still be acting fairly and honestly? Where there is an improper motive of either party 
that can be proven, as in this case, can a party still be acting either reasonably or in 
good faith?
68
 
 
(b) Termination under a break clause 
A break clause is incorporated in a lease to permit the lessor (usually) to terminate a 
lease upon a specified period of notice, prior to the expiration of the term for some 
particular purpose stated in the lease, usually refurbishment, renovation or 
demolition. These clauses are sometimes known in Australia as “demolition” 
clauses. Generally, where a lessor gives such a notice, it must be on the basis that 
the lessor has a bona fide intention of pursuing that course which was the stated 
reason given in the notice. The notice must be given in conformity with the right to 
give it under the lease.
69
 In Blackler v Felpure Pty Ltd,
70
 a clause in a lease 
permitted a lessor to terminate the lease upon six months notice where the lessor 
wanted to “repair, renovate or demolish the premises.” Being a retail shop lease, s 
35 of the Retail Leases Act 1994 (NSW) applied to the notice. This section 
recognised a right in the lessor to terminate a lease on the grounds of proposed 
demolition of the building in which the retail shop was situated, but only if the 
lessor had provided the lessee with details of the proposed demolition sufficient to 
indicate a genuine proposal to do so and subject to certain other conditions. At a 
time when the lessee had just exercised an option to renew, the lessors had been 
negotiating to sell the shopping centre to purchasers. Upon the purchasers’ 
                                                 
67
  In JA McBeath Nominees Pty Ltd v Jenkins Development Corporation Pty Ltd [1992] 2Qd R 121, 
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68
  Compare, for example, the effect of proof of the improper motives of an assignee of a lease where 
refusal of consent to an assignment was held to be reasonable: Pimms Ltd v The Master, Mordens 
and Commonalty of the Mystery of Tallow Chandlers in the City of London [1964] 2 QB 547 at 
572. 
69
  Southend-on-sea Estates Co Ltd v Inland Revenue Commissioners [1914] 1 KB 515 at 524; 
affirmed [1915] AC 428. 
70
  (2000) 9 BPR 17, 257. 
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becoming the owners, the purchasers argued that the option had not been validly 
exercised. They purported to terminate the lease on the basis of their plans to 
renovate the building and required vacant possession to do so. In fact, they were 
planning to replace the lessee’s premises with offices from which they (the 
purchasers) could conduct their business.   
 
The lessee challenged the right to terminate to terminate the lease, particularly on 
the ground that the underlying basis of the termination was to put another occupant 
in possession and not to renovate the premises. Bryson J found, as a fact, that the 
lessor was genuinely planning to renovate the premises. This provided a sufficient 
reason to give the notice of termination which, subject to s 35 of the Retail Leases 
Act 1994, was an entitlement of the lessors’ under the lease. Bryson J said  
 
“The opportunity to break a lease, retake possession and take advantage of a 
demolition clause is a contractual opportunity made available to the lessor by the 
terms of the lease itself…  it is not injurious to the lessors’ position whether the 
lessor has decided to take that advantage and it is not relevant that the lessor has 
in view occupying the premises itself or selling them after reconstruction or 
leasing them again, even if the lease should be to business similar to the lessee’s.  
The demolition clause is a reality of the parties relationship and so is its potential 
to end the lease”.71 
 
This decision illustrates that a lessor may exercise a contractual right to his or her 
own advantage and not show lack of good faith. Here, the lessor did have a proposal 
within the meaning of the clause giving the right to terminate. It is note worthy that 
Bryson J indicated that he may have regarded the question more seriously if there 
had not been a genuine proposal to renovate. This may have shown evidence of a 
lack of good faith in dealing with the lessee. Commenting on this decision, Eileen 
Webb
72
 says that the judgment appears to make commercial sense and that the 
lessor was entitled to make a commercial decision in its own interests and not on an 
altruistic basis.
73
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72
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Even given the developments in the law relating to the implication of an obligation 
to exercise powers and good faith, a lessor who gave notice under a break clause, 
where the notice could only be given for specified purposes, and where those 
conditions had not been met, there is little doubt that the lessee could challenge the 
notice.
74
 It is also worthy of note, and mentioned by Webb,
75
 that s 51 AC of the 
Trade Practices Act 1974 might well render the lessors conduct unconscionable in 
these circumstances. One of the elements of unconscionability to which the court 
might have regard is the lack of good faith.
76
 
 
(c) Insistence by lessor on lessee meeting lawful requirements of legislation 
The case of Alcatel Australia Ltd v Scarcella
77
 provides an interesting instance of 
an attempt by a lessee to temper compliance with a clause of a commercial lease for 
50 years which required the lessee to observe lawful requirements of all Acts and 
regulations, and to execute work as required by that legislation indemnifying the 
lessor against claims in respect of liability in default of the lessor doing so. Briefly, 
lessors commissioned a fire safety report which found a number of deficiencies in 
the demised premises and sought a fire safety inspection from the local authority.  
As a result, the local authority issued a list of requisitions necessary to meet the fire 
safety requirements. At some time, these were passed on to the lessee with the 
request that they would be responsible for the work under the terms of the lease.  
About a year later, with no action having been taken by the lessee, the local 
authority intimated that it proposed to issue an order to the lessors requiring the 
work to be done, and, in fact, this occurred. The lessee found the requirements 
onerous but, under the Local Government Act 1993 (NSW) as then amended, only 
the owner could appeal against the order. Briefly, the lessee claimed that because 
the lessor had effectively pressured the local authority into imposing stricter and 
unreasonable fire safety requirements, the lessee was not obliged to comply with the 
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covenant in the lease which effectively made the lessee responsible for making 
good the requisitions. The lessee argued that it was an implied term of good faith or 
reasonableness required by the lessors in the performance of their obligations which 
bound the lessors to co-operate in a reasonable way to ensure that the lessee was not 
subjected to the expense of an unreasonable fire order.
78
 The court found that, in 
these circumstances, the duty could be implied as part of the lease. However, the 
lessee failed to demonstrate that the requirements of the fire safety order were 
unreasonable. On behalf of the Court of Appeal, Sheller JA concluded: 
 
“In a commercial context, it cannot be said, in my opinion, that a property owner 
acts unconscionably or in breach of an implied term of good faith in a lease of a 
property by taking steps to ensure that the requirements for fire safety advised by 
a fire engineer should be put in place.  It was… the contractual duty of the 
(lessee) to observe and perform the requirements of the council, if lawful, and to 
do and execute or cause to be done an executed such works as were required by 
the council.  The (lessors) had a legitimate interest in ensuring that the building 
was properly protected… I can see no reason why (the council) should not press 
for more stringent requirements”.79 
 
In commentary on this decision, Elisabeth Peden, correctly, in my view, states that 
it was completely unclear as to what method was used by the court to achieve result 
of the implication of an obligation of good faith in this case.
80
 Several conclusions 
may be drawn from this decision. Firstly, the lessor was acting within its legitimate 
rights to seek a fire safety report and a local authority inspection of the premises to 
ascertain whether the premises met fire safety requirements. Indeed, it was in the 
public interest that they do just that. Secondly, the lessors had every right under the 
lease negotiated at arms length, to pass on the cost and expense of these 
requirements to the lessee. Thirdly, the lessor had a right not to appeal the 
stringency of the requirements, regardless of the fact that the lessee may have 
considered the imposition of these requirements unreasonable. The consequence of 
contrary decision may have left the law in this regard a very unsatisfactory state.  
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Although the court undertook a significant examination of the law relating to 
implied terms of good faith, particularly in New South Wales, there are no express 
reasons given by the court why the term should be implied in leases. One presumes 
that inferentially, leases are being treated as contracts. On the other side of the coin, 
it is the duty of the lessee to satisfy itself as to the physical fitness of the premises 
for the purposes for which they are let. Such a term would be implied if it were not 
expressed.
81
 One could argue that a lessee taking a lease for 50 years might well 
concern itself with making financial provision for changes in fire safety 
requirements, knowing that the cost of any changes may well be sheeted home to 
that lessee over such a lengthy period. 
 
(d) An implied term that the lessor will do all in its powers to co-operate and 
permit the lessee to effect certain works upon the premises 
The decision of Advance Fitness v Bondi Diggers
82
 raises a novel point which 
impacts upon whether or not an implied term in the form of an obligation to co-
operate might be implied in an express lease. This obligation is closely allied to the 
good faith obligation. Under a commercial lease, a commercial building, 
constructed in the 1960s and 70s was demised to the lessee for ten years from 1991 
with an option for a further ten years. During the first term, fire safety requirements 
for such buildings became more onerous and the local authority, during the period 
of the lease, served a notice on the lessor requiring certain extensive building work 
to be undertaken to meet the new fire safety requirement. The lessor was then the 
head lessee rather than owner of the building, but successfully exercised an option 
to purchase the building in 1995 with a view to redevelopment of the building as 
residential apartments. To permit this project to proceed, the lessor (then as owner) 
required vacant possession of the lessee’s premises. The local authority deferred 
action on the notice until early 1998 when these arrangements had been clarified.  
However, by August 1998 the local authority made a further order requiring the 
lessor to address the deficiencies with respect to fire safety, including attention to 
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structural aspects of the building. As the lessor wished to redevelop the property, it 
was loathe to expend funds in this way. When the lessor did not comply with an 
order (in the first instance to submit plans) the local authority in October 1998 
issued an order requiring evacuation of the premises within 60 days. The lessee 
became aware of the requirements sometime before this and had contacted the local 
authority. The lessor, however, did nothing and welcomed the evacuation order to 
secure vacant possession of the building. After much negotiation, and an attempt by 
the lessor to lock out the lessee, the lessee sought an order that the lessor provide its 
consent to the local authority for the lessee to carry out the fire safety works 
required as a condition for the lessee to remain in occupation. Under the existing 
sublease, the lessor was under an obligation to undertake structural work (which 
was necessary to meet part of the requirements) and the lessee was under an 
obligation to complete the balance of the work. Essentially, the lessee’s case was 
that the lessor was obliged to co-operate to permit the lessee to effect the work at its 
option and expense or at least, not to refuse to co-operate unreasonably for 
extraneous purposes to achieve early vacant possession. The lessor denied that there 
was any express or implied obligation requiring it to carry out the work and, 
alternatively, if there was, it could not be unqualified, and must be in a form in 
which the lessor retained a discretion whether or not to consent to the works being 
done. 
 
The court then had to determine whether or not in this specific instance, an implied 
obligation of good faith or fair dealing arose in this lease and, if so, whether or not 
the lessor was in breach of this. There was little doubt, from the evidence, that the 
lessor wished the lessee to vacate and had a strong commercial incentive to do so.  
Secondly, it was clear that if the work was not permitted to be carried out because 
of the lack of co-operation of the lessor, the lessee would have to vacate.   
 
Austin J refused to imply a term that the lessor had an obligation to co-operate or 
imply a term that the lessor exercise the contractual power to refuse reasonably or 
in good faith. The reason for this, his Honour said, was because compliance with 
 20 
the fire safety requirements “cannot be classed as something the parties have agreed 
shall be done”. Effectively, as his Honour found, the express terms of the lease dealt 
with the rights and obligations of the parties with respect to repairs and compliance 
with requirements of statute. There was no room for implication of a term.
83
 Austin 
J also found no room for the application of any obligation of fair dealing or good 
faith or reasonableness as he did not regard the lessor’s conduct in the commercial 
context as inconsistent with this duty. This finding went hand in hand with a finding 
that the lessor engaged in conduct designed to make it difficult for the lessee to 
carry on business in the demised premises and acting with a view to securing vacant 
possession of the building for its own purposes.
84
 
 
This view is legally consistent with that of Waddell J in an earlier decision of Brilee 
Consultants Pty Ltd v Tibal Holdings Pty Ltd
85
 where the court would not imply an 
obligation upon a lessor to require the lessor to comply with a notice from the local 
authority with respect to fire safety on the basis of some implied obligation of the 
lessor to keep the demised premises fit for occupation. In the lease, the subject of 
this litigation, the lessor expressly did not warrant the demised premises would 
remain suitable or adequate for the purposes of the lessee. Accordingly, there could 
be no implied warranty which had the effect of negating the force of that express 
clause, regardless of how that implied obligation might be cast.
86
 
 
The decision of Advance Fitness v Bondi Diggers
87
 in this context suggests 
strongly, that where ground is covered effectively by the written agreement between 
the parties, there will be little room for implied terms, whether this implied term is 
to co-operate or an implied obligation of good faith. Commercial leases are, of 
themselves, usually lengthy documents which cover the field and those types of 
agreements where terms are less likely to be implied than perhaps than in other 
types of agreements. Secondly, just because the lessor was found to be “guilty of 
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improper commercial conduct”,88 there is no automatic implication that the lessor 
had breached an implied obligation of good faith. In the words of Austin J:  
 
“… fairness does not require that, in all circumstances of this case, (such) 
misconduct should entitle the (lessee) to compel the (lessor) to consent to 
substantial work which it does not wish to have done to the building which it 
owns – nor, in my opinion, does the law.”89 
 
Further, as noted by Elisabeth Peden, addressing this point in her article,
90
 the 
implication of this term was not necessary for the business efficacy of this lease.  
The parties were entitled to perform their obligations in their own interests. The net 
effect of this decision meant that the lessor did not have to consent to substantial 
building work on the premises as required by the fire safety order and, accordingly 
the work not being done, the lessee was bound to vacate the premises, thus giving 
the lessor the green light to redevelop free of the lease.   
 
Would the Implication of a Term of Good Faith in Commercial Leases usually be 
Necessary? 
As previously suggested in this article, commercial leasing arrangements between lessor 
and lessee are already highly regulated, particularly so in the case of retail shop leases.
91
 
The few cases in the area of good faith in commercial contracts tend to suggest that 
obligations of good faith and reasonableness are more readily implied in standard form 
contracts, particularly if such contracts contain a general power of termination but the 
implication is not limited to these forms of agreement.
92
 Most commercial leases, 
however, are not what could be called standard form agreements and many, in fact, are 
unique, either to the particular demised premises or to the actual commercial complex. 
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Clearly, the most significant power enjoyed by a lessor vis a viz a lessee, is the power of 
termination of the lease where the lessee is in breach. In practice, a lessor will invariably 
reserve himself or herself the right to terminate a lease and a right to re-enter and forfeit 
the estate where the lessee is in breach of any term of the lease. This right of termination 
my be exercised whether or not the term breached is essential or non-essential, or put 
another way, whether its breach would attract substantial damages or nominal damages.
93
  
This power of re-entry, which had to be expressly reserved by the lessor, was treated in 
equity as security for the payment of rent.
94
 As a rule, equity would relieve against the 
forfeiture of a lease upon the payment of rent, and likewise, will generally relieve against 
forfeiture where any other breach relied upon is not essential and where satisfactory 
arrangements have been made for the breach to be remedied.   
 
Legislation now recognises the consequences of termination for breach by providing in 
various states that a lessee be given a statutory notice to remedy breach within a 
reasonable time before a right of re-entry might accrue for the breach.
95
 It is common 
ground that Australian courts regulate the operation of general rescission clauses by 
preventing their use for improper and extraneous purposes.
96
   
 
The right to grant relief against forfeiture maybe generally granted on such terms as to 
costs, damages, compensation, penalty or otherwise as the court think fits.
97
 In 
considering whether or not to grant relief, a court will look at the entire circumstances of 
the alleged breach including the general conduct of both lessee and lessor, the seriousness 
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of the breach, whether the breach can be easily remedied and whether compensation 
might be an adequate remedy rather than forfeiture.
98
 
 
This is but one example of the wide variety of statutes that enable a court to review the 
behaviour of parties to a commercial agreement and to give relief to an aggrieved party.  
The existence of these statutory provisions, and particularly those in the Trade Practices 
Act 1974 relating to unconscionability
99
 was recognised in the landmark decision on good 
faith, Reynard Constructions (ME) Pty Ltd v Minister for Public Works
100
 in the principal 
judgment of Priestley JA.
101
 It could therefore be argued, particularly in relation to the 
termination of leases, that the principles of equity which might properly govern the 
party’s conduct are now embodied in statutory form and more than adequately permit a 
court to review misconduct and grant relief where appropriate. The existence of such 
statutory provisions rather negates the necessity for a court to imply terms of 
reasonableness and good faith in considering these issues, especially in the context of 
default, however that arises. 
 
This very point was taken up by Gummow J in Service Station Association Ltd v Berg 
Bennett & Associates Pty Ltd
102
 where he expressed his view in the following terms: 
“Equity has intervened in matters of contractual formation by remedy of 
rescission, upon the grounds mentioned earlier. It has restrained freedom of 
contract by inventing and protecting the equity of redemption, and by relieving 
against forfeiture and penalties. To some extent, equity has regulated the quality 
of contractual performance by the various defences available to suit for specific 
performance and for injunctive relief. In some, but not all, of this, notions of good 
conscience play a part. But it requires a leap of faith to translate these well 
established doctrines and remedies into a new term as to the quality of contractual 
performance, implied by law.”103 
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This dictum has been seen as too narrow.
104
 However, that decision was not dealing with 
a commercial lease.   
 
Putting aside the question of good faith in the exercise of powers of rescission, it should 
be noted that two significant decisions, Alcatel Ltd v Scarcella
105
 and Advanced Fitness v 
Bondi Diggers,
106
 concerning commercial leases and the obligation of good faith were 
not cases on the implication of that term in exercising a power of termination. Rather, in 
both of these cases, the lessees were seeking sympathetic treatment by their respective 
lessors with respect to the interpretation of clauses in the respective lease relating to the 
extent of repair which was their express responsibility generally under the leases. Both 
lessees failed largely because the lessors were not doing anything contrary to the express 
terms of the lease to which the lessees had agreed. Interestingly though is the comment of 
Austin J in Advanced Fitness v Bondi Diggers
107
 in respect of the lessor’s position when, 
in his concluding remarks, he said that: 
 
“it may initially seem to be unfair that the plaintiffs (lessees) case fails, even 
though I have found officers of the defendant to be guilty of improper commercial 
conduct”.108   
 
Similarly, in the case of Australian Mutual Provident Society v 400 St Kilda Road Pty 
Ltd,
109
 in respect of refusal of consent to the subletting, the lessor was held to have a right 
to unreasonably refuse as the operation of Section 144 of the Property Law Act 1958 
(Vic) had been legally excluded.  It naturally would have been inappropriate for a court to 
imply terms which a party had an express right to exclude.  However, whilst McGarvie J 
was not prepared to disturb that decision of the lessor, he was prepared to hold, 
unconstrained by that statute, that the lessor had unreasonably withheld approval for the 
erection or construction of improvements to the building. In this, there was evidence of 
improper motive of the lessor forcing the lessee to agree to vary the terms of the lease 
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and not referrable to the substance of the decision.
110
 As previously stated, in respect of 
rights of assignment, which are generally qualified by statute, on improper motive in 
giving the refusal will found relief in the lessee.
111
 Where a lessor has a discretion and it 
is not constrained by statute, a refusal may be unreasonable and lawfully so.
112
 
 
 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, it is submitted that, given the extent of coverage of bargain that is usually 
express in a commercial lease, and given the statutory protections already available to a 
lessee to challenge the conduct of a lessor, there may only be a small area of operation 
left for the operation of the implied term of good faith. However, as can be seen from the 
relevant cases, where a lessor is merely protecting his or her legitimate interests and 
where a clause in the lease adequately covers the situation, although a lessor may be 
acting in a morally offensive manner, this conduct will have no legal implications for the 
lessee. In future, lessees’ cases may be strengthened if the parties mutually covenant in 
the lease itself that they will, throughout the term of the lease, exercise good faith in the 
conduct of their relationship. The rules of construction would then ensure that every 
express obligation was undertaken and every discretion exercised, subject to that 
condition.  However, in the absence of an express term, in appropriate circumstances, s 
51AC(3)(K) of the Trade Practices Act 1974 may well come to the aid of an aggrieved 
lease. 
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